Animal Signals 1st Edition by John Maynard Smith, David Harper ISBN 0198526857 9780198526858

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Product details:

ISBN 10: 0198526857

ISBN 13: 978-0198526858

Author:  John Maynard Smith, David Harper 

Animal Signals 1st Edition: Why are animal signals reliable? This is the central problem for evolutionary biologists interested in signals. Of course, not all signals are reliable; but most are, otherwise receivers of signals would ignore them. A number of theoretical answers have been proposed and empirical studies made, but there still remains a considerable amount of confusion. The authors, one a theoretician the other a fieldworker, introduce a sense of order to this chaos. A significant cause of confusion has been the tendency for different researchers to use either the same term with different meanings, or different terms with the same meaning. The authors attempt to clarify these differences. A second cause of confusion has arisen because many biologists continue to assume that there is only one correct explanation for signal reliability. The authors argue that the reliability of signals is maintained in several ways, relevant in different circumstances, and that biologists must learn to distinguish between them. In this book they explain the different theories, give examples of signalling systems to which one or another theory applies, and point to the many areas where further work, both theoretical and empirical, is required.

 

Animal Signals 1st Edition Table of contents:

1. Introduction: What Are Signals?

   • 1.1 Introduction
   • 1.2 Signals and Cues
   • 1.3 The Problem of Reliability
   • 1.4 The Forms of Signals
     • 1.4.1 Efficacy
     • 1.4.2 Evolutionary Origin
     • 1.4.3 Mimicry
     • 1.4.4 Sensory Manipulation
   • 1.5 Action-Response Games, and Some Alternatives
   • 1.6 Sexual Selection
     • 1.6.1 Paternal Care
     • 1.6.2 Sexually Attractive Sons
     • 1.6.3 ‘Good Genes’-Indices and Handicaps
     • 1.6.4 The Female Gets Nothing (Sensory Exploitation)
   • 1.7 Definitions and Terminology

2. The Theory of Costly Signalling

   • 2.1 Introduction
   • 2.2 A Brief History of the Handicap Principle
   • 2.3 The Philip Sidney Game
     • 2.3.1 The Discrete Model
     • 2.3.2 A Model with Continuously Varying Signallers
     • 2.3.3 A Model with Continuously Varying Signals and Responses
     • 2.3.4 Perceptual Error
     • 2.3.5 Conclusions
   • 2.4 ‘Pooling Equilibria’ – A More Radical Proposal
   • 2.5 Non-Signalling Equilibria
   • 2.6 Must Honest Signals Always Be Costly?
   • 2.7 Conclusions

3. Strategic Signals and Minimal-Cost Signals

   • 3.1 Introduction
   • 3.2 Strategic Signals
     • 3.2.1 Stalk-Eyed Flies
     • 3.2.2 Musth in Elephants
     • 3.2.3 Chick Begging
   • 3.3 Minimal-Cost Signals
     • 3.3.1 When Can Minimal-Cost Signals Be Evolutionarily Stable?
     • 3.3.2 Signals Between Unrelated Individuals with a Common Interest
     • 3.3.3 Relatedness
     • 3.3.4 Kin Recognition
   • 3.4 Conclusions

4. Indices of Quality

   • 4.1 Introduction
   • 4.2 Are Mammalian Sounds Reliable Indices of Size?
   • 4.3 The Evolution of Indices
   • 4.4 Indices in Different Contexts
     • 4.4.1 Indices of Condition
     • 4.4.2 Indices of Size and RHP
     • 4.4.3 Performance Indices
     • 4.4.4 Parasites
     • 4.4.5 Indices of Ownership
     • 4.4.6 Signals in Contests, and in Mate Choice
   • 4.5 Indices and Handicaps
   • 4.6 Some Problem Cases
     • 4.6.1 Stotting
     • 4.6.2 Fluctuating Asymmetry
     • 4.6.3 Displays of Weapons

5. The Evolution of Signal Form

   • 5.1 Ritualization
   • 5.2 Efficacy
   • 5.3 Arms Races, Manipulation, and Sensory Bias
     • 5.3.1 Introduction
     • 5.3.2 A Model, and an Experiment
     • 5.3.3 The Response to Novel Signals
     • 5.3.4 The Comparative Data
     • 5.3.5 Conclusions
   • 5.4 Sensory Manipulation
     • 5.4.1 Frogs and Swordtails
     • 5.4.2 Nuptial Gifts in Insects
     • 5.4.3 Further Examples of Sensory Manipulation
   • 5.5 Mimicry and Cheating

6. Signals During Contests

   • 6.1 Introduction
   • 6.2 Badges of Status
     • 6.2.1 An Avian Example
     • 6.2.2 ESS Models of Badges
     • 6.2.3 Conclusions
   • 6.3 Can Signals of Need Settle Contests?
     • 6.3.1 The War of Attrition
     • 6.3.2 The War of Attrition with Random Rewards
     • 6.3.3 A Model of Conventional Signals of Need
     • 6.3.4 Conclusions
   • 6.4 Punishment
   • 6.5 Protracted Contests and Varied Signals
     • 6.5.1 Varied Signals – The Evidence
     • 6.5.2 Cichlid Fishes and the Sequential Assessment Game
     • 6.5.3 Spider Fights, and a Motivational Model
     • 6.5.4 Territorial Behaviour and the Negotiation Game
   • 6.6 Conclusions

7. Signals in Primates and Other Social Animals

   • 7.1 Introduction
   • 7.2 Vervet Monkeys: A Case Study
   • 7.3 How Does the Ability to Signal Develop?
   • 7.4 Questions About What Is Going on in an Animal’s Head
     • 7.4.1 Do Signals Convey Information About the External World?
     • 7.4.2 Do Signallers Intend to Alter the Behaviour of Receivers?
     • 7.4.3 Conclusions
   • 7.5 Social Reputation and the Honesty of Signals
     • 7.5.1 Introduction
     • 7.5.2 A Model
     • 7.5.3 Evidence for Direct Reputation
   • 7.6 Emotional Commitment
     • 7.6.1 Cultural and Innate Behaviour
     • 7.6.2 ‘Altruistic Punishment’ in Humans
     • 7.6.3 Mutual Displays
     • 7.6.4 The Interpretation of Group Displays
   • 7.7 Human Language
     • 7.7.1 Cultural Inheritance in Chimpanzees
     • 7.7.2 The Peculiarities of Human Language
     • 7.7.3 The Evolution of Language

 

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