How to Know A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge 1st Edition by Stephen Hetherington 0470658126 9780470658123

Table of Contents

1. The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge
1.1 Knowing is a Belief State (or Something Similar)
1.2 Knowledge is Well Supported
1.3 Knowledge is Absolute
1.4 Knowing Includes not being Gettiered
1.5 Knowledge-that is Fundamentally Theoretical, not Knowledge-how
1.6 The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge
1.7 Prima Facie Core Problems

• 1.7.1 The Justificationism Problem
• 1.7.2 The Gettierism Problem
• 1.7.3 The Theoreticalism Problem

2. Knowledge-that as Knowledge-how
2.1 The Rylean Distinction
2.2 The Rylean Argument
2.3 Wittgenstein on Rule-following
2.4 The Knowledge-as-Ability Hypothesis
2.5 Justification
2.6 Grades of Knowledge
2.7 Denying Knowledge-Absolutism: Clear Precedents

2.7.1 Augustus de Morgan

2.7.2 Rudolf Carnap

2.7.3 Norman Malcolm

2.7.4 W. V. O. Quine

2.7.5 Jaakko Hintikka

2.7.6 David Lewis

2.7.7 Alvin Goldman

2.7.8 Christopher Peacocke

2.7.9 Ernest Sosa

2.7.10 Baron Reed
2.8 Denying Knowledge-Absolutism: Possibly only Apparent Precedents

2.8.1 Locke

2.8.2 Russell

2.8.3 Contextualism
2.9 Sceptical Challenges
2.10 Sceptical Limitations
2.11 Epistemic Agents
2.12 Abilities
2.13 Rylean Mistakes
2.14 Conclusion

3. Gettier? No Problem
3.1 Gettier Situations
3.2 A Counter-Example to ‘Gettier’s Official Result’
3.3 Ordinary Gettiered Knowledge
3.4 A Meta-Gettier Problem
3.5 Objections Answered
3.6 Gettier-Luck as Veritic Luck?
3.7 Gettier-Luck is not Veritic Luck
3.8 Gettier-Luck is Combinatorial Luck
3.9 Combinatorial Luck: Applications
3.10 Knowing in a Combinatorially Lucky Way
3.11 Gettier-Holism Versus Gettier-Partialism
3.12 Combinatorial Safety
3.13 Combinatorial Gradational Safety
3.14 Epistemological Privilege and Epistemological Empathy
3.15 Gettier Situations and Sceptical Situations
3.16 Timothy Williamson

4. Is This a World Where Knowledge has to Include Justification?
4.1 Justificationism, Broadly Understood
4.2 The ‘Causally Stable World’ (CSW) Thesis
4.3 Knowledge Within Causally Fluky Worlds
4.4 Knowledge as Putatively Pervasive
4.5 Non-tethering Justification
4.6 Linguistic Intuitions
4.7 Kinds of Intension
4.8 Conditional Justificationism
4.9 Knowledge Within Different Possible Worlds
4.10 Wholly General Justificationism
4.11 A Thin or Minimal Concept of Justificationism
4.12 Knowledge Within Causally Semi-fluky Worlds
4.13 Evidence and Counter-Evidence
4.14 Timothy Williamson

5. Knowledge-that as How-Knowledge
5.1 Knowing How it is that p
5.2 How-Knowledge that p and Gradualism
5.3 Degrees of Knowledge and Degrees of Belief
5.4 How-Knowledge that p and Truthmakers
5.5 Knowledge that p and Gradualism
5.6 Knowledge-Gradualism’s Central Concept
5.7 Can There be Minimal Knowledge?
5.8 Minimal Knowledge as Foundational Knowledge
5.9 Knowledge-Gradualism: Closure and Scepticism
5.10 Knowledge-Gradualism: Content Externalism and Self-Knowledge
5.11 How not to Argue for Knowledge-Absolutism
5.12 Linguistic Evidence: Igor Douven
5.13 Linguistic Evidence: Jason Stanley
5.14 How-Knowledge-how that p
5.15 Knowing as Understanding?

6. A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge
6.1 This Book’s Theory: A Summary and a Name
6.2 Core Problems Evaded
6.3 Further Practicalist Reconceptions
6.4 A Predictive Practicalism?
6.5 J. L. Austin on ‘Trouser-words’
6.6 Wittgensteinian Certainty — Generalised